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THE SEC AS ENVIRONMENTALIST: THE RELUCTANT CHAMPION
I. Introduction
Corporations raise capital through the issuance of securities. Corporations,
at times, also pollute the environment. The interaction of these two simple facts
has created considerable difficulty for corporations, investors, those concerned
with the environment, the SEC, and the court.' This note examines how en-
vironmentalists have tried to use the federal securities laws as a means of con-
trolling corporate environmental behavior, and how a reluctant SEC has been
induced to assist in this endeavor. The following situations illustrate some possible
interactions between securities law and environmental concerns.
Situation 1. Professor Sandpiper of the Natural Resources Coalition de-
scribes in a speech to concerned environmentalists how his organization raises
money for environmental litigation through an investment plan which purchases
only securities of "environmentally responsible" corporations. A young chemical
engineer informs Professor Sandpiper, in the presence of the large audience,
that two of the corporations in which the Natural Resources Coalition has heavily
invested are major polluters of Tonquish Creek, a particularly wild and scenic
river. Professor Sandpiper sputters that he had "read the stock prospectus of each
corporation" prior to buying any stock and that he "had no idea ... ."2
Situation 2. The Matilda Johnson Trust invests heavily in the United
Chemical Corporation, the maufacturer of floor care products. United Chemical,
while experimenting with a new floor wax that would also serve as an insecticide,
discharges waste into Saginaw Bay killing vast numbers of perch, the mainstay of
several commercial fishing fleets. The Matilda Johnson Trust had no knowledge
that United Chemical had such potential liabilities from their discharges. As the
owners of the fishing fleets file their actions the stock of United Chemical becomes
virtually worthless.3
Situation 3. United Chemical Corporation and its attorneys have done a.
thorough job of disclosing all pending civil actions based on environmental claims
in order to comply with the requirements adopted by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) in 1980,' which mandate such disclosure in an issuer's
prospectus and registration statement. Three days prior to the registration state-
ment's effective date,5 the Hickory Creek Association, a litigious environmental
group, informs United Chemical that it intends to file an environmental suit
in the local federal court. Counsel for Hickory Creek realizes that this action
1 See Natural Resources Defense Council v. SEC, 432 F. Supp. 1190 (D.D.C. 1977);
Natural Resources Defense Council v. SEC, 389 F. Supp. 689 (D.D.C. 1974); Securities Act
Releases, No. 5704 (May 6, 1976). No. 5627 (Oct 16, 1975), No. 5569 (Feb. 11, 1975),
No. 5386 (Apr. 10, 1973), No. 5235 (Feb. 16, 1972) and No. 5170 (July 19, 1971).
2 Professor Sandpiper and the Natural Resources Coalition are both fictional. Sandpiper
introduces the concept of the "ethical investor." See text accompanying notes 11-13, 96 infra.
3 Although this too is a hypothetical, the situation is similar to an actual event. See note
13 infra.
4 This is a purely fictional requirement, but very similar to rules proposed to the SEC
by several environmentalists. See text accompanying notes 107-08 infrar
5 Before sales and purchases of certain securities can be made, a registration statement
filed with the SEC must become "effective." See text accompanying notes 32-35 infra.
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could very well cause the SEC to "deny acceleration" 6 until appropriate dis-
closure of this new suit is made. After expressing his sympathy for United Chem-
ical's plight, counsel for Hickory Creek suggests that, perhaps, "an arrangement"
could be made that would remove the danger of a suit and the SEC's possible
denial of acceleration.'
II. Overview
There are a variety of ways in which corporate environmental pollution can
be controlled. The corporation itself, through its directors, officers, and share-
holders8 can plan, monitor, and alter the effect that corporate operations have on
the environment. Traditional tort law has for some time provided rights of
action for injuries caused by environmental pollution.' Also, a variety of federal,
state, and local statutes grant rights of action to governments and private citizens
as a remedy for corporate pollution.0
Tort law and anti-pollution statutes, however, are not entirely satisfactory
solutions to many of the problems occasioned by corporate pollution. First, the
remedies provided by these means are primarily retrospective in application (i.e.,
the pollution must occur before the cause of action arises). These devices are,
thus, not primarily preventive in nature. Moreover, any litigation would neces-
sarily be on a case-by-case basis, involving specific facts for a specific situation.
Although a case-by-case approach might be a desirable method for the develop-
ment of a judicial doctrine, it is a rather ineffective device for preventive or
planning purposes.
A second problem not reached by tort law or anti-pollution statutes is the
strong interest potential investors, shareholders, and the general public have in
knowing of, and influencing, corporate environmental policies and practices. 1
For example, Situation 1, above, presents the problem of the "ethical investor."'"
A potential investor often wishes to know a corporation's policy on a particular
social issue prior to investing in that corporation, whose policies and practices
might be antithetical to the personal persuasion of the investor. Besides potential
6 "Acceleration" refers to the SEC's discretionary power to grant an early effective date
for the registration statement in lieu of the statutorily prescribed twenty-day waiting period.
See 15 U.S.C. § 77h (a) (1970) and text accompanying notes 50-54 infra.
7 This hypothetical introduces the concept of "effective date blackmail." Because the
consequence of a denial of acceleration is usually the failure of a particular issuance of
securities, any threat to acceleration can serve as an effective motivator of corporate behavior.
See also Friedlob & Sanderson, infra note 17.
8 Shareholders can have an effect on corporate behavior only if they are informed of
relevant issues. The problem of the informed shareholders is addressed later in this note.
9 See Cities Service Co. v. State, 312 So. 2d 799 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (strict
liability for abnormally dangerous activities); Spur Industries Inc. v. Del E. Webb Develop-
ment Co., 108 Ariz. 178, 494 P.2d 700 (1972) (nuisance theory); Davis v. Georgia Pacific
Corp., 251 Or. 239, 445 P.2d 481 (1968) (trespass theory for air pollution). See also
Maloney, Judicial Protection of the Environment-A New Role for Common Law Remedies,
25 VAND. L. REV. 145 (1972).
10 See, e.g., Clean Air Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857 c-8, 1857 h-2 (1970); Federal
Water Pollution Control Amendments of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (Supp. II 1972).
11 Whether this interest is a legally protected one and under what authority it might be
protected is an open question. See Scientists' Institute for Public Information v. AEC, 481 F.2d
1079 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
12 See Natural Resources Defense Council v. SEC, 389 F. Supp. 689, 693 (D.D.C. 1974);
J- SIMION, C. POWERS, & J. GUNNEMAN, THE ETHICAL INVESTOR: UNIVERSITIES AND
CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY (1972).
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investors, present shareholders also have an interest in knowing corporate policy,
to enable them to vote in corporate matters in a manner consistent with the
shareholder's personal interests.
Potential investors and shareholders have an additional financial interest in
knowing the corporation's environmental behavior, as Situation 2, above, demon-
strates. Advance notice of corporate policies and practice might serve to warn an
investor or shareholder of the risks to which the corporation is exposing itself
through its activities. 3
Furthermore, shareholders and the general public have a common informa-
tional interest 4 in corporate environmental behavior. Before any pressure can
be exerted on a corporation, either by its shareholders or the general public, to
change its environmental policies and practices, the policies and practices must be
known.
As early as 1971 it was recognized that the disclosure requirements of the
Securities Act of 1933 5 (1933 Act) and the Securities Exchange Act' (1934
Act) might provide a method of controlling corporate environmental behavior
and a means of reaching some of the problems left unsolved by tort law and anti-
pollution statutes.' The 1933 Act and the 1934 Act were adopted as a'means of
disclosing a variety of corporate behavior in an effort to protect investors and
shareholders.' The theory has often been advanced that, in addition to protect-
ing investors, the disclosure requirements serve as stimuli to change undesirable
corporate practices. 9
Environmentalists, and others, now seek to use these functions of the 1933
Act and 1934 Act to exert pressure on corporations whose environmental
practices are seen as undesirable. A brief look at the SEC's written thoughts on
the matter,2" however, demonstrates that the SEC has been reluctant to assume
the environmental advocacy role by adopting wide disclosure requirements.
If the SEC had total discretion over which disclosure requirements to adopt
there would be little profit in debating which requirements the SEC should adopt
once the decision had been made. But, as with other federal administrative
agencies, the decision of the SEC to adopt particular disclosure requirements
pursuant to its rulemaking power21 is subject to the procedural requirements of
13 A graphic and recent example is SEC v. Allied Chemical Corp., Civil Action No. 77-
373 (D.D.C. filed March 4, 1977) in which the SEC alleged that Allied omitted "to state in
public announcements and in filings with the Commission that Allied was subject to material
potential financial exposure resulting, in part, from directly and indirectly discharging toxic
chemicals into the environment [specifically, discharging Kepone into the James River in
Virginia] from its own facilities and from the facilities of others." Complaint 7.
14 See note 11 supra
15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1970).
16 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78hh-1 (1970).
17 Sonde & Pitt, Utilizing the Federal Securities Laws to "Clear the Air! Clean the Sky!
Wash the Wind!" 16 How. L. J. 831 (1971) and Friedlob & Sanderson, The Environment
and the Federal Securities Laws, 15 B. C. INDUS. & Com. L. Rav. (1973).
18 See Preamble to Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1970); Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1970).
19 The classic statement of this view is contained in BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY
92 (1932 ed.). "Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial diseases.
Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; the electric light the most efficient policeman."
20 See text accompanying notes 61-70, 91-118 infra.
21 15 U.S.C. § 77s (1970), 15 U.S.C. § 78w (1970).
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the Administrative Procedure Act22 (APA).
The APA provides methods for public input in the exercise of rule-making
power by administrative agencies. The public input can range from the sug-
gestion of new rules23 to judicial review of rulemaking at the request of those
adversely affected by the adoption or non-adoption of administrative rules.24
The APA has been one of the wedges used by environmental groups in their
attempts to force the reluctant SEC to adopt broader environmental disclosure
requirements."
The SEC's rulemaking in relation to environmental matters presents a
sufficiently complex issue when just the SEC, environmental disclosure pro-
ponents, and the APA are considered. The issue acquired further complexity,
however, with the enactment of the National Environmental Policy Act of 196926
(NEPA). The NEPA, in part, provides that: "The Congress authorizes and
directs that, to the fullest extent possible: (1) the policies, regulations, and the
public laws of the United States shall be interpreted and administered in ac-
cordance with the policies set forth in this chapter .. ,,2" The NEPA policies
referred to above are sweeping statements of the intention to make federal actions
compatible with the limitations of the environment." In the context of this note,
the question which arises is the applicability of this requirement to SEC rule-
making.
These three variables (SEC disclosure requirements, the APA, and the
NEPA) have interacted to produce potentially significant litigation. One en-
vironmental group (the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC)) and the
SEC have, for several years, been disputing exactly what the NEPA requires the
SEC to consider when it makes disclosure rules.29 That controversy and its
ramifications form the central focus of this note.
III. The SEC as a Point of Intervention
At first glance, one might wonder why an environmental group, whose
primary dispute is with polluting corporations, would spend great amounts of
time and money in disputes with the SEC. A brief look at the pervasive and
powerful nature of the SEC's regulatory function, however, shows the potential
reward for the environmentalists. Given the appropriate disclosure requirements,
the securities laws could be an effective tool for changing corporate behavior.
This point becomes clearer after an examination of the SEC's regulatory scheme.
The most important pieces of securities regulation, for the purposes of this
22 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706 (1970).
23 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (1970).
24 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970).
25 See Natural Resources Defense Council v. SEC, supra note 7.
26 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970).
27 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970).
28 See 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (1970), which provides in part:
The Congress . . . declares that it is the continuing policy of the Federal Govern-
ment, . . . to use all practicable means and measures, . .. in a manner calculated
to foster and promote the general welfare, to create and maintain conditions under
which man and nature can exist in productive harmony, and fulfill the social, eco-
nomic, and other requirements of present and future generations of Americans.
29 See text accompanying note 7 supra and notes 72-96, 119-132 infra.
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note, are the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act. Both acts were designed primarily to
safeguard investors from inadequate disclosure of corporate matters that could
materially affect the investor's interest."s They differ in that the 1933 Act was
designed to regulate the initial offering of securities while the 1934 Act regulates
the trading of securities after the initial offering. The framework of the Acts is
easiest to understand if it is viewed as consisting of three parts; A. Registration
and Reporting Requirements, B. Registration and Report Content, and C. Sanc-
tions.
A. Registration and Reporting Requirements
The 1933 Act starts with the basic premise that before any person can offer
to buy or sell any security through interstate commerce, a registration statement
must be filed with the SEC." Before an actual sale or purchase of securities can
be made through interstate commerce, the registration statement must become
"effective."3 2
In addition to the initial registration requirement of the 1933 Act, the 1934
Act requires the registration of securities traded on national securities exchanges 3
and of the securities of certain issuers. 4 The major significance of registration
under the 1934 Act is that it requires the submission of periodic reports as long
as the security retains its registered status,"5 a necessity if the security is to be
traded.
B. Registration and Report Content
The central function of registration under the 1933 Act is the disclosure of
corporate matters required by the registration forms.3 In addition to the registra-
tion statement, the issuer is also required to supply a prospectus, which discloses to
potential investors much of the information contained in the registration state-
ment.3 The 1934 Act performs its disclosure function through report forms"
30 The term "materially affect the investor's interest" is used here in its conversational
sense. See 17 C.F.R. § 230-405 (1977) for the SEC's definition of the much litigated term,
"material."
31 15 U.S.C. § 77e (c) (1970).
32 15 U.S.C. § 77e (a) (1970). There are, however, a number of exceptions to the gen-
eral registration requirement. In the 1933 Act 15 U.S.C. §§ 77c, 77d (1970), are the ex-
ceptions for certain transactions and certain types of securities. For examples of specific ex-
ceptions to the registration requirement, see 15 U.S.C. § 77c (11) (1970) which exempts
securities sold only in an intrastate offering, and 15 U.S.C. § 77d (1) which exempts trans-
action by persons who are not issuers, underwriters or dealers. The exceptions and the def-
initions of critical terms are a constant source of litigation.
33 15 U.S.C. § 781 (a) (1970).
34 Issuers engaged in interstate commerce having total assets of more than $1,000,000 and
a class of equity security held by more than 500 record shareholders must register under the
1934 Act if their securities are traded through interstate commerce. 15 U.S.C. § 781 (g)
(1970).
35 15 U.S.C. § 78m (a).
36 15 U.S.C. § 77h (1970), Schedule A, and Form S-1 of the Securities Act are the
generally used authorities to determine what items must be disclosed.
37 15 U.S.C. § 77j (1970).
38 See 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1970) which requires those registering under 15 U.S.C. § 781
(1970) to submit the reports required under Regulation 13A of the Securities Exchange Act,
the most common being Forms 10-K (Annual Report), 10-Q (Quarterly Report) and 8-Q
(Current Report). A similar reporting requirement is placed on issuers who have registered
under the 1933 Act whether or not they have registered under the 193+ Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78o
(d) (1970).
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and a requirement of disclosure of certain corporate matters prior to the solicita-
tion of proxies39 and certain tender offers."
As to what corporate matters must be disclosed, the 1933 Act and the 1934
Act require disclosure of information that ". . . the Commission may be rules or
regulations require as being necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for
the protection of investors."'" Given this broad authorization, the SEC has de-
veloped specific disclosure items, illustrated by headings in the required state-
ments and forms such as "Description of Business,"" "Legal Proceedings," '4 3 and
"Remuneration of Directors and Officers."4 These items are, in turn, further
augmented by "Instructions" which specify exact disclosure content. 5
C. Sanctions
The consequences arising from inadequate disclosure or failure to follow
the registration and reporting requirements can assume a variety of forms. The
SEC can, for some violations, transmit evidence of suspected illegal practices to
the United States Attorney General who has the authority to institute criminal
proceedings.46 The SEC can also seek injunctions in federal courts to prevent
practices it considers to be in violation of its rules and regulations.47
In addition to court action, the SEC can prevent a registration statement
from becoming effective, which would prevent the sale or purchase of the
affected securities, if it believes there is inadequate disclosure in the registration
statement." The SEC can also suspend a registration statement that has already
become effective.49
One of the more effective sanctions the SEC has is the denial of "accelera-
tion." This device, which is not a formalized, statutory sanction, developed
through Commission practice."0 A large issuance of securities is a complex and
carefully timed endeavor. Because the securities market fluctuates, the actual
price asked for the new securities cannot be set until just prior to the date the
securities are allowed to be sold. The usual practice is to set the price the day
prior to the registration statement's effectiveness date. The price, however, is a
material part of the disclosure requirements of the 1933 Act and therefore should
39 15 U.S.C. § 78n (a) (1970).
40 15 U.S.C. § 78n (d) (1970).
41 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 7 7g, 77j (c) (1970); 15 U.S.C. §§ 781 (b)(1), 78m (a)
(1970).
42 See, e.g., Securities Act, Form S-1, Item 9; Securities Exchange Act, Regulation 13A,
Form 10-K, Item 1.
43 See, e.g., Securities Act, Form S-1, Item 12; Securities Exchange Act, Regulation 13A,
Form 10-K, Item 5.
44 See, e.g., Securities Act, Form S-1, Item 17; Securities Exchange Act, Regulation 13A
Form 10-K, Item 16.
45 See, e.g., Securities Act, Form S-1, Item 12, Instruction 4 which describes certain
reporting requirements for actions pending that are based on environmental claims.
46 15 U.S.C. § 77t (b) (1970); 15 U.S.C. § 78u (d) (1970).
47 15 U.S.C. § 77t (b) (1970); 15 U.S.C. § 78u (d) (1970).
48 15 U.S.C. § 77h (b) (1970); 15 U.S.C. § 78m (j) (1970).
49 15 U.S.C. § 77h (d) (1970); 15 U.S.C. § 78m (j) (1970).
50 See 15 U.S.C. § 77h (a) (1970), which provides in part, "the effective date of a
registration statement shall be the twentieth day after the filing thereof or such earlier date
as the Commission may determine, . ...' See also Woodside, Development of SEC Practices
in Processing Registration Statements and Proxy Statements, 24- Bus. LAW. 375 (1969).
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be disclosed in the registration statement and prospectus.5 Theoretically, after
the price is set, there should be a twenty-day waiting period before the registra-
tion statement, now containing the price, would become effective. But at the
end of twenty days the price would probably not reflect current market trends.
Because the situation thus presented was impractical, the practice has developed
whereby, once the registration statement is completed, the issuer requests an ac-
celerated effectiveness date.5 This allows the issue to go effective shortly after the
price is set. The SEC, however, retains the discretion to deny acceleration,
especially if it believes there is inadequate disclosure. The deniai of acceleration
can destroy any market advantage of a new securities issuance. Hence, the sanc-
tion is a rather effective SEC tool. 4
In addition to the sanctions that can be administered by the SEC and the
United States Attorney General, the 1933 Act and 1934 Act provide private
rights of action for damages resulting from SEC law violations.55
The importance of SEC law to environmentalists is obvious. The SEC
and its regulation of securities touch virtually all corporate entities. The in-
formation that could be derived from broad environmental disclosure require-
ments could be of great use. Finally, the SEC's sanctions could ensure corporate
disclosure, thereby relieving environmentalists of the task of extracting the in-
formation at their own expense.
IV. The Development of Environmental Disclosure
A. Initial Developments
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) indicated that all
federal agencies should consider the environmental consequences of all their
regulatory activities, including rulemaking.56 Prior to 1971, however, there was
no specific mention of environmental matters in SEC disclosure requirements.
In 1971, several sources considered the possible impact of the NEPA on
SEC rulemaking. Two SEC attorneys, in a law review article,57 expressed the
view that the NEPA mandated consideration by the SEC of environmental
matters in its rulemaking, and suggested that
[T]he Commission can, and should, require corporate entities to disclose
what they are doing to the environment. [S]uch disclosure could thus be used
as an additional weapon in the federal arsenal directed at environmental
problems and hopefully, will serve as another aid in remedying this "social
and industrial disease."58
51 See Securities Act, Form S-1, Item 1.
52 15 U.S.C. § 77h (a) (1970).
53 See Woodside, supra note 50.
54 Id. See note 6 supra and Situation 3 for an example of how acceleration could be used
for blackmail.
55 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771 (1970); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j, 78r (1970). See atso SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69
F. Supp. 512 (E.D.Pa. 1946).
56 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970).
57 See Sonde & Pitt, supra note 17.
58 Id. at 849-50.
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Also in 1971, the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) filed a
rulemaking petition59 with the SEC requesting that the Commission adopt certain
detailed environmental disclosure rules.6 Before ruling on the petition, the SEC
issued Release No. 517061 which called attention to the requirement of "the
disclosure of legal proceedings and the descriptions of the registrant's business as
these requirements relate to material matters involving the environment and
civil rights."62 The release did not suggest any new disclosure requirements but
was apparently just a reminder of the preexisting requirement of material mat-
ters.
In late 1971, the SEC denied the NRDC's rulemaking petition6 but two
months later announced that it was considering proposals that would "require
the disclosure of the effect on the issuer's business of compliance with Federal,
State, and local laws and regulations relating to the protection of the environ-
ment."64 In asking for public comment, the SEC noted that its actions were
being taken pursuant to the NEPA6
Early in 1973, the SEC in Release No. 5386 finally adopted specific dis-
closure items relating to the environment. 6 The new requirements further
clarified the concept of materiality in regard to disclosure items relating to the
description of the registrant's business6 7 and legal proceedings. 8 The "description
of business" items required the disclosure of the material effects that compliance
with anti-pollution laws would have on capital expenditures, earnings, and the
competitive position of the registrant.6 The "legal proceedings" items required
the disclosure of proceedings initiated by governmental units under anti-pollution
laws, and suits brought by private parties if material or if the claim alleged
damages exceeding 10% of the current assets of the registrant."
Two weeks after the SEC's release, a disappointed NRDC brought an action
against the SEC in the District Court of the District of Columbia. The complaint
sought review of the SEC's denial of the NRDC's rulemaking petition and review
of the new environmental disclosure rules.7'
B. Natural Resources Defense Council v. SEC I.
The NRDC, joined by other plaintiffs,7 brought its action against the SEC
59 SEC File No. 4-179. See Securities Act Release No. 5627 (Oct. 14, 1975) at 40 Fed.
Reg. 51,657 (1975).
60 The suggested disclosure requirements are set forth in Securities Act Release No. 5569
(Feb. 11, 1975) at 40 Fed. Reg. 7,014 (1975), and summarized in Natural Resources Defense
Council v. SEC, 389 F. Supp. 689, 694 (D.D.C. 1974).
61 Securities Act Release No. 5170 (July 19, 1971), 31 Fed. Reg. 13989 (1971).
62 Id. at 36 Fed. Reg. 13,989 (1971).
63 The SEC denied the petition on December 21, 1971. See SEC File No. 4-179 and
Securities Act Release No. 5704 (May 6, 1976) at 41 Fed. Reg. 21,632 (1976).
64 Securities Act Release No. 5235 (Feb. 16, 1972) at 37 Fed. Reg. 4,365 (1972).
65 Id.
66 Securities Act Release No. 5386 (Apr. 10. 1973), 38 Fed. Reg. 12,100 (1973).
67 Id. at 38 Fed. Reg. 12,100 (1973).
68 Id. at 38 Fed. Reg. 12,101 (1973).
69 Id. at 38 Fed. Reg. 12,101 (1973).
70 Id.
71 Natural Resources Defense Council v. SEC, 389 F. Supp. 689 (D.D.C. 1974).
72 Other plaintiffs were the Project on Corporate Responsibility, Inc. and the Center on
Corporate Responsibility.
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challenging the denial of the rulemaking petition of June, 1971,"8 and asserting
that the SEC did not follow the requirements of the APA and the NEPA when
it adopted its disclosure requirements in Release No. 5386."4 The court, Judge
Richey delivering the opinion, concluded that the SEC had failed to conform
with the APA. Accordingly, it directed the SEC to undertake further rulemaking
to bring ". . . the Commission's corporate disclosure regulations into full com-
pliance with the letter and spirit of NEPA.'"
To reach its decision, the court addressed three issues: 1. Jurisdiction and
Standing, 2. NEPA Requirements, and 3. APA Requirements.
1. Jurisdiction and Standing
The court easily found a statutory basis for jurisdiction." In part the court
relied on 28 U.S.C. § 1337, which grants jurisdiction to federal courts for actions
arising under federal laws regulating interstate commerce, which would include
the securities acts.77 Jurisdiction was also found under certain sections of the
APA. 5 U.S.C. § 702 provides that "[a] person suffering legal wrong because of
agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the
meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof."7 The court
also found that Release No. 5386 was a final agency action, not committed to
agency discretion, and was therefore subject to judicial review."9
The court employed the test of standing articulated in Sierra Club v.
Morton"0 and United States v. S.C.R.A.P.8 ' and found that (1) there was
"injury in fact" and (2) the injury was to an interest within the zone of interest
protected by both the federal securities law and the NEPA."2
NRDC, and the other plaintiffs, established standing to the court's satisfac-
tion by asserting primarily an informational interest in the items that would be
discovered through broad disclosure requirements. The court found that:
".... Plaintiffs have been deprived information necessary for their organizational
purposes because of the SEC failure to adopt regulations requiring broader
disclosure in the environmental and equal employment opportunity areas. The
injury, though in part non-economic, is sufficient injury to support Plaintiffs'
standing to sue."8 3
The court also found that the plaintiffs' interests fell within the interest pro-
tected by the disclosure philosophy of the securities acts, not only because of the
plaintiffs' role as public educators, but also because of their interest in making
73 389 F. Supp. at 692-93.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 693.
76 Id. at 696.
77 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1970) provides in part, "The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action or proceeding arising under any Act of Congress regulating
interstate commerce. ... "
78 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970). The "legal wrong" that the plaintiffs suffered was the SEC's
failure to follow the procedural requirements of the APA- in its rulemaking. See text accom-
panying notes 87-94 infra.
79 389 F. Supp. at 696-97.
80 405 U.S. 727 (1973).
81 412 U.S. 669 (1975).
82 389 F. Supp. at 697.
83 Id. at 698.
NOTES
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
socially responsible investment and voting decisions.8 4
The NEPA states, in part, that "all agencies of the Federal Government
shall- . . . Make available to . . . institutions, and individuals, advice and in-
formation useful in restoring, maintaining, and enhancing the quality of the en-
vironment." 5 The court concluded that the plaintiffs' interests were also pro-
tected by this statute.
2. NEPA Requirements
The court saw the NEPA as an overlay to the SEC's broad rulemaking
authority. The question of the applicability of the NEPA's requirements to SEC
rulemaking was answered in strong terms:
NEPA gives specific content to the SEC's authority under the securities laws
to require disclosure of information "in the public interest." [T]hus,
Congress has directed the SEC and this Court to interpret the securities
laws to the fullest extent possible in accordance with the overriding Con-
gressional mandate of NEPA to protect and enhance the Nation's environ-
ment.
8 6
The court, it appeared, was insisting that the SEC give more than a cursory
acknowledgement to the NEPA.
3. APA Requirements
Under the APA, a federal agency must give general notice of proposed
rulemaking, including reference to the legal authority under which the rule is
proposed. The agency must also give notice of the terms or substance of the
proposed rule or a description of the subjects and issues involved. The purpose
is to give interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rulemaking.
After consideration of the data received from those participating, the agency
should include in the rules adopted a "concise general statement of their basis
and purpose." 9
Once a rule is adopted, or not adopted, a reviewing court can set aside the
agency's action if it finds that the action was arbitrary and capricious or not
in observance or procedure required by law.9"
The primary thrust of the court's opinion in NRDC was that the SEC's
rulemaking was in violation of the APA. Judge Richey concluded that the SEC
had not "entered into a reasoned consideration of the changes it should effect in
its disclosure rules and regulations as a result of NEPA's passage."'" The court
also found inadequate the notice of proposed rulemaking in Release No. 5235,9"
84 Id.
85 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970).
86 389 F. Supp. at 695 (emphasis supplied).
87 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2) (1970).
88 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (3) (1970).
89 5 U.S.C. § 555(c) (1970).
90 5 U.S.C. § 706(1)(A) and (D) (1970).
91 389 F. Supp. at 699.
92 Securities Act Release No. 5235 (Feb. 16, 1972), 37 Fed. Reg. 4365 (1972).
[June 1978]
[Vol. 53:985]
stating: "Certainly the notice should have been calculated to elicit comment
from legal scholars, public interest groups, foundations, colleges, universities, and
other institutions and individuals who participate in the nation's capital markets
and who may want to comment about what the SEC legally could and should
do to fulfill NEPA."'
'
In addition to finding fault with the SEC's notice, the court found that the
SEC did not give an adequate "concise general statement" of the new rules' basis
and purpose. 4
The court ordered the SEC to reconsider its environmental disclosure rules
and to provide a more complete statement of its rulemaking rationale, so that
the court could determine: "(1) the SEC's concept of the extent of its statutory
obligation to the public under the securities acts and NEPA, (2) the alternatives
which are considered, and (3) the reasons for excluding substantial alternatives
which may be proposed by interested parties."9
The court also directed the SEC to develop a record and to resolve two
factual issues: first, the extent of "ethical investor" interest in the type of dis-
closure information that had been sought by the plaintiffs, and, second, the
actions that might be available to the plaintiffs or other "ethical investors" to
eliminate the undesired corporate practices.9"
C. The SEC Tries Again
In February, 1975, the SEC gave notice97 that public hearings were to be
held concerning disclosure requirements dealing with environmental and other
matters of primarily social rather than financial concern. The SEC said that it
welcomed views on (1) the advisability of required disclosure of socially signifi-
cant matters, (2) whether and on what basis these disclosures might be material
in an economic sense, (3) the basis and extent of the SEC's authority to require
disclosure of matters "primarily of social concern but of doubtful economic
significance,"9 " and (4) the probable impact of such disclosure on corporate
behavior. The SEC, however, made it clear that it took a rather dim view of
such disclosure.9
In October, 1975, the Commission issued a release announcing its con-
clusions and proposals for further rulemaking concerning environmental disclo-
sure.' 0 After stating that it had tried to ensure wide distribution of the notice of
proposed rulemaking, the Commission noted that 19 days of hearings had been
held, 54 oral and 353 written comments had been received, and a file of informa-
tion of over 10,000 pages had been assembled.' In the lengthy release, the SEC
93 389 F. Supp. at 700.
94 Id. at 701.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Securities Act Release No. 5569 (Feb. 11, 1975), 40 Fed. Reg. 7,013 (1975).
98 Id. at 40 Fed. Reg. 7,014 (1975).
99 "The fact the Commission is conducting these proceedings should not be taken to
indicate any view as to its authority to assist members of the investing public in matters of
primarily social rather than financial concern." 40 Fed. Reg. 7,014 n.2.
100 Securities Act Release No. 5627 (Oct. 14, 1975), 40 Fed. Reg. 51, 656 (1975).
101 Id. at 40 Fed. Reg. 51,657 (1975).
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concluded that it was not authorized to consider the promotion of social goals un-
related to the objectives of the federal securities laws,'02 but that it was, never-
theless, required by NEPA to consider environmental matters.103 The Commis-
sion concluded that "NEPA authorizes and requires the Commission to consider
the promotion of environmental protection 'along with other considerations' in
determining whether to require affirmative disclosures ...although the NEPA
3104does not require any specific disclosures...
The SEC conceded that there was some indication of "ethical investor"
interest in social disclosure, noting that most investors expressing an interest in
such disclosure would use the information for voting decisions rather than in-
vestment decisions.' The SEC also mentioned that investors did not have ready
information concerning environmental practices and that such information, if
disclosed, would probably be used to some effect by investors and shareholders.' 0
According to the SEC, the major alternatives considered for rulemaking
were: (1) comprehensive disclosure of the environmental effects of corporate
activities, (2) disclosure of corporate noncompliance with environmental stand-
ards, (3) disclosure of all pending environmental litigation, (4) disclosure of
general corporate environmental policy, and (5) disclosure of all capital ex-
penditures and expenses for environmental purposes. 0 7 All of the alternatives
except (2) were rejected. The reasons given were primarily those of costs, ad-
ministrative burden, and that the requirements would not provide any additional
"meaningful information to investors.' 0 8
The SEC then proposed amendments to its disclosure rules that would have
required the registrant to provide the SEC, in the form of an exhibit attached
to certain documents filed with the Commission,'" with "a list of the most
recently filed environmental compliance reports, which indicate that the regis-
trant had not met ...any applicable environmental standard established pur-
suant to a federal statute.""' These amendments were to be coupled with
amendments that would have required a registrant to include in the various reg-
istration statements and reports a statement that the exhibit mentioned above had
been filed with the SEC and was available at a reasonable cost.:"
In addition to these amendments, Release No. 5627 proposed amendments
to the "description of business" items which would have required disclosure of
material estimated capital expenditures for environmental control facilities." 2
In May, 1976, the Commission announced in Release No. 5704 its final
conclusions and actions in regard to environmental disclosure."' In doing so, the
SEC retreated from the proposals offered in Release No. 5627. Noting that the
102 Id. at 40 Fed. Reg. 51,660 (1975).
103 Id. at 40 Fed. Reg. 51,662 (1975).
104 Id.
105 Id. at 40 Fed. Reg. 51,663-65 (1975).
106 Id. at 40 Fed. Reg. 51,665 (1975).
107 Id. at 40 Fed. Reg. 51,662 (1975). "All" is an important distinction from "material."
108 Id. at 40 Fed. Reg. 51,663 (1975).
109 Id. at 40 Fed. Reg. 51,667 (1975).
110 Id.
111 Id. at 40 Fed. Reg. 51,667-70 (1975).
112 Id. at 40 Fed. Reg. 51,668-70 (1975).
113 Securities Act Release No. 5704 (May 6, 1976), 41 Fed. Reg. 21,632 (1976).
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comments received on the proposal to require lists of registrants' environmental
compliance reports were "almost unanimously opposed""' 4 to the requirement,
the Commission withdrew that part of the proposed rules. The Commission also
reasoned that the rejected proposal was too costly and provided little additional
meaningful information for investors." 5 Of the proposals in Release No. 5627,
only the proposal relating to disclosure of material expenditures for environ-
mental compliance purposes remained."'
After Release No. 5704, the requirements for environmental disclosure con-
sisted of three parts: (1) the rules requiring disclosure of material effects of
compliance with environmental laws on capital expenditures, earnings and the
competitive position of the registrants, (2) the requirement of disclosure of all
known or contemplated environmental litigation brought by governments, and
material litigation brought by non-governmental parties, and (3) the general
securities law requirement of disclosure of all material information necessary to
prevent filings from being false or misleading." 7
This structure, the SEC concluded, was sufficient to "satisfy the Commis-
sion's obligation under the federal securities laws and the National Environ-
mental Policy Act of 1969 ("NEPA")." 1" 8 The NRDC and others did not
agree.
D. Natural Resources Defense Council v. SEC II
Returning to the District Court for the District of Columbia, the NRDC1.9
again challenged the SEC's action on the basis of the APA and the NEPA. The
plaintiffs, conceded that the SEC had satisfied the procedural requirements of the
APA and had made an adequate statement of the reasons for its rulemaking.'
This time, however, NRDC alleged that the SEC's final rulemaking was
"arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law."'' As part of their argument that the SEC's actions were "otherwise not in
accordance with law," the plaintiffs asserted that the NEPA required the SEC to
compel substantial corporate environmental disclosure. "'
The district court, in its May, 1977, decision, rejected the plaintiffs' position
that NEPA mandated substantial environmental disclosure rules.'2 ' The court
did, however, emphasize that the Commission must consider seriously, "to the
fullest extent possible," alternatives which would reduce environmental dam-
age. "4 This, the court concluded, the SEC had not done. The court particularly
114 Id. at 41 Fed. Reg. 21,633 (1976).
115 Id. at 41 Fed. Reg. 21,635 (1976).
116 Id. at 41 Fed. Reg. 21,632 (1976).
117 Id. at 41 Fed. Reg. 21,635 (1976).
118 Id. at 41 Fed. Reg. 21,632 (1976).
119 The NRDC was now joined by the Project on Corporate Responsibility, Inc., the Center
for Corporate Responsibility, Inc., the National Organization for Women, the Unitarian
Universalist Association, the American Baptist Home Mission Society, and the Province of
St. Joseph of the Capuchin Order.
120 Natural Resources Defense Council v. SEC, 432 F. Supp. 1190, 1194 (D.D.C. 1977).
121 The quoted language comes directly from 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2) (1970).
122 432 F. Supp. at 1197.
123 Id. at 1198.
124 Id.
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took issue with the SEC's position expressed in Release No. 5704,125 that other
federal agencies had the necessary environmental expertise and should take the
initiative to require disclosure.'26 For this, and other reasons, the court found
the SEC's action in violation of NEPA procedure." 7
An alternative basis for the court's holding was that the SEC's actions were
arbitrary and capricious. Judge Richey found fault with the SEC's apparent
assumption that its environmental disclosure standards must necessarily be the
same for each of the several different filings and disclosure documents.'28 He
stated that the Commission should have given more serious consideration to dis-
closure of information to shareholders via proxy solicitations and information
statements, particularly in light of the SEC's findings in Release No. 5627120
that investors would use environmental information more in voting decisions
than in investment decisions.' The court also found that the SEC's findings of
excessive cost, administrative burden, and the lack of feasibility of developing
appropriate disclosure guidelines and standards were not supported by sufficient
facts."'
The court ruled that "despite the fact that the proceeding has been ongoing
for over six years""' 2 the SEC must undertake further rulemaking. The new
proposals and rules have yet to be published.
V. Synthesis
What can be predicted for Professor Sandpiper, the Matilda Johnson Trust,
United Chemical, the Natural Resources Defense Council and the SEC? Two
issues are important in the analysis of the future of environmental disclosure.
One is the question of what the NEPA really requires of the SEC. The other
is what sort of disclosure rules could be made by the SEC that would satisfy the
NEPA and environmentalists, and still not add significantly to the expense and
complexity of the registration and reporting process.
A. NEPA Requirements
It is fairly clear that the NEPA does not absolutely require environmentally
based decisions in federal rulemaking."' A typical example of a court's ex-
planation of the NEPA's impact on rulemaking is that in Calvert Cliffs Co-
ordinating Comm. v. AEC."4 In that case the D.C. Circuit concluded that
"Congress did not establish environmental protection as an exclusive goal....
125 Securities Act Release No. 5704 (May 6, 1976), 41 Fed. Reg. at 21,634 (1976).
126 432 F. Supp. 1207.
127 Id.
128 Id. at 1205.
129 Securities Act Release No. 5627 (Oct. 14, 1975), 40 Fed. Reg. at 51,664 (1975).
130 432 F. Supp. at 1205.
131 Id. at 1206.
132 Id. at 1212.
133 See Flint Ridge Development Co. v. Scenic Rivers Association 426 U.S. 776 (1976);
Natural Resources Defense Council v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 547 F.2d 633
(D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 429 U.S. 1090 (1977).
134 Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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[T]he general substantive policy of the Act is a flexible one. It leaves room for a
responsible exercise of discretion and may not require particular substantive
results . ...135
Although the NEPA does not guarantee any particular rules, it does restrict
the discretion of federal agencies. The Supreme Court in Flint Ridge Develop-
ment Co. v. Scenic Rivers Associatior"6 recently recognized the nature of the
duty imposed by the NEPA. Referring to language in the NEPA," 7 the Court
said that the phrase "to the fullest extent possible' is neither accidental nor
hyperbolic. Rather, [it] is a deliberate command that the duty NEPA imposes
upon the agencies to consider environmental factors not be shunted aside in the
bureaucratic shuffle."' 138 It appears, then, that the duty the SEC has in regard to
the NEPA is somewhere between mandatory adoption of substantial disclosure
rules and a routine rejection of environmentally based disclosure.
B. The Future of Environmental Disclosure
The SEC has yet to formulate new disclosure rules pursuant to the order in
Natural Resources Defense Council v. SEC. II. It appears, however, in light of
Judge Richey's two prior rejections of attempted SEC rulemaking, that greater
environmental disclosure requirements will be required.
If additional environmental disclosure is necessary, the question arises as to
its content and form. The consideration of new rules will necessarily involve a
balancing of the competing factors of broad environmental disclosure and the
additional expense and complexity such disclosure may entail.
The conflict between broad environmental disclosure and additional ex-
pense and complexity could, however, be more illusory than substantial. Solu-
tions to the conflict are easier to reach if the consideration of new disclosure
requirements starts with an analysis of two separate issues: (1) what kind of dis-
closure should be required- and (2) how should the disclosure be made. "
Brief reflection will show that the questions of what disclosure and how the
disclosure should be made are separable.
There is nothing inherently-unworkable with any of the five alternatives for
environmental disclosure presented in Release No. 5627.4' The objections of
cost, unreadable and lengthy registration statements and reports, etc., are not
actually directed toward what disclosure is advisable, but are objections directed
at how the disclosure will be made. For example, if comprehensive disclosure
were required in all registration statements and 1934 Act reports, the cost, in
terms of time and money, would probably be prohibitive. But if comprehensive
disclosure were required only once a year, or once every two years, the cost would
135 Id. at 1112.
136 426 U.S. 776 (1976).
137 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970).
138 426 U.S. at 787.
139 See 432 F. Supp. at 1205. Here Judge Richey criticized the SEC's "across the board"
theory of disclosure and stated that different disclosure requirements for different types of
filings might be acceptable. This appears to be a recognition of the fact that how is a
separate issue from what.
140 See text accompanying note 107 supra.
[Vol. 53 :985] NOTES
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
be less. If the disclosure were not part of the registration statement or reporting
requirements, the objection of complexity would be largely removed.
1. What Kind of Disclosure?
Starting from the proposition that the mechanical aspects of disclosure are
distinct from the substance of the disclosure, the first issue is what kind of dis-
closure should be required.
Comprehensive disclosure of the environmental effects of corporate activities,
as in alternative (1) in Release No. 5627,"+' is not a totally unworkable concept.
The SEC has offered the objections of expense and complexity, but those ob-
jections are, as seen before, primarily directed at the mechanics of disclosure.
They have little relevance to whether such information should be disclosed. The
SEC has also taken the position, however, that the securities laws deal only with
financial disclosure and that comprehensive environmental disclosure is a "social
issue" beyond the scope of the SEC's function. 2 This argument could be met,
as it has been, by citing the NEPA and the provisions in the securities laws that
allow disclosure rules to be made that require disclosure "in the public inter-
est."'4 3 Comprehensive disclosure would have the benefit of forcing corporations
to monitor their effects on the environment more closely. Also, if such disclosure
were made, the problem of the "ethical investor" would be addressed. Professor
Sandpiper could invest and vote according to the dictates of his conscience with-
out fear of later embarrassment.
Setting aside again the question of how, no particular difficulty arises with
respect to the disclosure of corporate noncompliance with anti-pollution laws,
corporate environmental policy, and of all capital expenditures and expenses for
environmental purposes. None of this information is impossible to obtain and
it could be quite useful to investors and shareholders.
Disclosure of all pending environmental litigation poses more serious
difficulties. Suits can arise at any time and can range from the material to the
insignificant and vexatious. The possibility of suits brought for the primary pur-
pose of inclusion in a registrant's disclosure materials is a consideration as Situa-
tion 3, at the beginning of this note, demonstrates. The limitations on disclosure
of environmental litigation adopted in Release No. 570414 are probably the best
alternative.
In short, a variety of disclosure alternatives are possible if the questions of
what and how are separated. The most complex question is really not what kind
of disclosure should be made, but how the disclosure could be accomplished.
2. How Should Disclosure Be Made?
The mechanics of broad environmental disclosure present some difficult
problems. These complications are more easily addressed if a distinction is made
141 Id.
142 See note 99 supra.
143 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77g (1970); 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1970).
144 See text accompanying note 117 supra.
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between financial disclosure and social disclosure. For the limited purposes of this
discussion, this note will assume that broad environmental disclosure can be
classified solely as "social issue" disclosure, although it should be noted that this
proposition is not universally true."5
Financial disclosure is particularly important in the initial decision to pur-
chase and trade ifi securities. The information is also subject to fairly rapid
change. Because of these features of financial information, disclosure require-
ments should emphasize accurate and current financial data.
Social disclosure, on the other hand, is different from financial disclosure in
that the information on which it is based is more stable. Presumably a corpora-
tion's policy in regard to environmental or equal employment opportunity mat-
ters does not change as dramatically as the financial market. Similarly, the
corporation's effect on the environment is probably more predictable and stable
than is its financial situation.
In view of the differences between financial and social disclosure, the
mechanics of disclosure for the two categories could also differ. Social disclosure,
including broad environmental disclosure, is not restricted to the same format
as financial disclosure. Accordingly, this note proposes a method for social dis-
closure, including environmental disclosure, that is not directly related to the
methods now used under the 1933 Act and 1934 Act for essentially financially-
related disclosure.
A registrant could, in conjunction with the annual reporting requirement
under the 1934 Act,4 6 submit a detailed report on a variety of social issues,
including environmental issues. This disclosure would not have to be keyed to
disclosure items already in existence. In fact, it might be easier for the SEC to
construct a completely original "social disclosure" document rather than attempt
to graft social disclosure items onto essentially financial items.
Once a social disclosure document were submitted to the SEC, it would
acquire the status of a "filed" document, subject to liability for false and mislead-
ing statements." 7
Actual disclosure to investors and shareholders could be made by referring
to the social disclosure document in the various registration and reporting re-
quirements of the 1933 Act and 1934 Act. The interested party could then
obtain a copy of the document from the SEC. The party could also help defray
the cost of this procedure by paying a reasonable fee for the document.
VI. Conclusion
It appears that the SEC will be required to adopt broader environmental
disclosure rules. The task is complex, but it could be simplified by separating
145 The difference between social and financial matters is not always clear or mutually
exclusive. See the Allied Chemical case in note 13 supra.
146 Securities Exchange Act, Regulation 13A, Form 10-K.
147 "Filed" status is important. For example, the information included in a Form 10-K
filed with the SEC is subject to the provisions of 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1970) which imposes
liability for false or misleading statements. If the document did not have "filed" status, a
claim could not be based on 15 U.S.C. § 7 8 r (1970). See Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909 (2d
Cir. 1968).
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the issue of what disclosure should be required from how the disclosure could be
accomplished. The question of how the disclosure could be accomplished could
be simplified by recognizing the differences between financial and social dis-
closure. The necessity of drawing such distinctions demonstrates that, in attempt-
ing to design the mechanics of workable environmental disclosure rules, the SEC
will have to "imaginatively exercise its authority and expertise."'
48
David A. York
148 389 F. Supp. at 702.
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